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INTRODUCTION 
Appellants, through counsel, respectfully submit the following Brief of the 
Appellants, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
Carbon County, State of Utah, granting Defendant Oakwood's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002 & Supp.2005) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)G)(2002 & Supp. 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE #1: Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's motion for 
summary judgment where facts pertaining to Appellee's liability were in dispute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering a grant of summary 
judgment, the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, 
giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2005); Drysdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, (Utah 1997). 
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SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2002 & Supp. 
2005); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2005); 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998);1 Interwest 
Consti'uction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996); Taylor v. Cooper Tire and 
Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, (Utah 
1998). 
ISSUE #2: Did the trial court err in concluding that a "checklist" 
proffered by Appellee proved compliance with government regulations and created 
a rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness, where the document is hearsay, is 
not self-authenticating, was not supported by affidavits proving the evidentiary 
foundation for the document, and contradicts the Code of Federal Regulations 
governing the subject matter at issue? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering the admissibility of evidence, 
the appellate court reviews the trial court decision for an abuse of discretion. Slisze 
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 979 P.2d 317. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2005); 
24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998); Utah R. Evid. 802 (2005); State v. Sibert, 310 
P.2d 388, 6 Utah 2d 198 (1957). 
1
 Title 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 was enacted December 18, 1975. Subsection 
(b)(6) provides: "Rodent resistance. All exterior openings around piping and 
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents" was enacted. On 
October 25, 1993 the rule was last amended, which continued to have the same 
language about "Rodent resistance." Subsection (b)(6) was in effect in 1998 when 
the home was manufactured and remains in effect to date. 
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ISSUE #3: Did the trial court err by considering issues raised for the 
first time by Appellee in its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, 
when those issues were not raised in its motion or initial memorandum? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 
P.3d 540. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (2005); Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c) (2005); Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540. 
ISSUE #4: Did the trial court err in granting Rule 54(b) certification 
and adopting verbatim Appellee's findings of facts and conclusions of law when 
such facts were disputed among remaining parties who were not parties to the 
summary judgment proceedings? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether an order is "final" is a question of 
law; therefore, the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision on this point 
for correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1991). 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)(2005); 
Kennecott Corp v. State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
ADDENDUM 1: 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998). 
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ADDENDUM 2: Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2002 & Supp. 2005). 
ADDENDUM 3: Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2005). 
ADDENDUM 4: Utah R. Evid. 802 (2005). 
ADDENDUM 5: Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (2005). 
ADDENDUM 6: Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: On March 11, 20005 Reid and Cathy 
Dimick met their son, Chris Dimick, at the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper to 
shop for a manufactured home for Chris. While touring a home that was sitting on 
the outdoor sales lot, Cathy and Chris Dimick opened a bedroom closet door and 
were exposed to a nest and "droppings" (feces) from deer mice, carriers of 
Hantavirus. 
On May 27, 2000, within the incubation window for Hantavirus, Cathy 
Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus, and died within three days of the 
onset of her illness. Three days after Cathy's death, Chris became violently ill 
with Hantavirus. He survived an extended illness, but is now permanently 
disabled. 
Defendant/Appellee Oakwood manufactured the home at issue and 
transported it to the sales lot in Utah. Appellants allege that the home was 
defective because Appellee intentionally manufactured 30-50 "knock-out holes" 
4 
into the sidewalls and underside of the home—and left those holes open and 
uncovered—despite having actual knowledge that the home was destined for a 
sales lot in Helper, Utah, where Hantavirus-carrying deer mice are commonly 
found. Appellants allege that the holes provided access points for deer mice, that 
deer mice left hantavirus-laden nestings and droppings in the manufactured home, 
and that Cathy and Chris Dimick were thereby exposed to and contracted the 
deadly virus. The ostensible purpose for the holes was to connect electrical and 
plumbing hook-ups, once the home was permanently placed on a buyer's 
foundation. 
On April 11, 2002, Appellants filed a Complaint and Jury Demand against 
the manufacturers, Oakwood, and other defendants, including the owners and 
operators of the sales lot. 
The complaint included claims for Strict Liability; Wrongful Death; Breach 
of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach of Warranty of 
Merchantability; Breach of Express Warranty; Negligent Failure to Warn; and 
Premises Liability. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: On October 14, 2004, 
Defendant Oakwood, using answers obtained solely from Interrogatories, Requests 
For purposes of summary judgment, it was not disputed that the Dimicks 
were actually exposed to Hantavirus in the manufactured home. (See R. at 382, 
427-433, 453). 
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for Production and Depositions from co-defendants, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, attacking only Appellants' strict liability theory. On November 17, 
2004, Appellants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, noting that were responding to the only claim 
attacked by Appellee's motion—the strict liability theory—and noted that 
Appellee's motion should more properly have been styled as a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. On November 24, 2004, Oakwood filed its Reply 
Memorandum, attacking for the first time Appellants' claims for Breach of Implied 
Warranty (fitness); Breach of Warranty (Merchantability); Breach of Expressed 
Warranty; Negligent Failure to Warn; and Premises Liability. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: On February 28, 2005, 
the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding, heard oral 
argument and took the case under advisement. On April 14, 2005, the trial court 
granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment with directions for the 
Appellee to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Subsequently, 
Appellee submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On April 
29, 2005, Appellant timely objected to the proposed Findings and Conclusions as 
being unsupported by the record, overbroad, and as seeking Rule 54(b) 
certification when that relief had not been sought in Appellee's moving papers. 
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On July 29, 2005, the trial court signed the Order as proposed by Appellee, 
without having seen or considered Appellants' objection to the proposed order. On 
August 25, 2005, after discovering this oversight, the trial court withdrew its July 
29, 2005 Order and scheduled oral argument on Appellants' objection. On 
September 23, 2005, the trial court reissued the Order, as drafted by Appellee, and 
certified the Order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
The remaining parties are the owner/operators of the sales lot where the 
manufactured home sat. The claims against the owner/operators are Wrongful 
Death; Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach of 
Early in the proceedings in the trial court, Defendant Oakwood filed a 
petition for bankruptcy. The real party in interest thereafter (Appellee herein) 
became the entity retained to liquidate the bankrupt estate, called the Oakwood 
Homes Liquidation Trust. On October 14, 2005, based on the summary judgment 
order, Appellee obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court (in Wilmington, 
Delaware) disallowing all of Appellants' claims. On October 17, 2005, 
Appellants—without having been given notice of the Bankruptcy Court's order— 
filed their Notice of Appeal. On November 2, 2005, Appellee's bankruptcy 
counsel wrote to undersigned counsel, contending that the prosecution of this 
appeal violated the Bankruptcy Court's order. On December 12, 2005, Appellants 
requested an extension of the briefing schedule in this appeal, to enable the 
Bankruptcy Court to hear the "Dimick Claimants' Motion for Reconsideration" of 
the Order disallowing their claims. On December 15, 2005, this Court extended 
the briefing schedule herein. 
On January 30, 2005, after an evidentiary hearing in the bankruptcy court, 
the parties stipulated that the Order disallowing the Dimick claims be vacated, and 
that Appellee would be responsible to the limits of the $250,000 self insured 
retention under Oakwood's liability insurance policies, with any remaining 
judgment to be addressed with Appellee's insurance carriers. Thus, this appeal 
proceeds unaffected by proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court. 
7 
Warranty of Merchantability; Breach of Expressed Warranty; Negligent Failure to 
Warn; Premises Liability; and Strict Liability. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
1. Appellee-manufacturer, Oakwood Homes, owned the manufactured 
home at issue as it sat on the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. The title to 
each manufactured home is held by a finance company until each home is sold to 
consumer(s). (Record on Appeal {hereinafter "R."), at 381, 390-391, 424-425). 
2. When the home manufactured by Oakwood was delivered to the 
Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, it had 30-50 holes in the underside and 
exterior walls. The holes were at least large enough for a piece of conduit to fit 
through. (R. at 382-384, 398-402). 
3. When homes manufactured by the Oakwood Appellee were delivered 
to the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, there were quite often rips and tears in the 
"belly paper" that was intended to cover and seal the underside of the homes. (R. 
at 382, 404-409). These rips were so common that the manufacturer regularly 
provided rolls of replacement belly paper. (R. at 382, 406-407). 
4. John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper, testified in 
deposition that the 30-50 penetrations in the underside and exterior walls of the 
manufactured home were for piping and venting and that the holes were sometimes 
caulked: 
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Q. [By Mr. Booke, Appellants' counsel] A little while ago you were 
talking about the penetrations that were sometimes put in the modular homes 
for plumbing and other reasons? 
A. [By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you 
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other reasons, 
electrical? 
A. The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and 
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I think they 
do in some instances put the expanding foam around the pipes where they 
penetrate. 
(R. at 451, 468-469). 
5. John Schram also testified that interior insulation could be seen 
through the penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465). 
6. Oakwood knew that manufactured homes shipped to Happy Homes 
were displayed in a lot that was in an open field. There was no means of 
preventing access by deer mice in the field where the homes were displayed. (R. at 
382,384,411-413). 
7. It has long been well known in the Price/Helper area that deer mice 
are carriers of Hantavirus. (R. at 382, 384, 417-419,421-425). 
8. On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick 
went into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, that was sitting on the Happy 
Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer 
mice nestings and droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436). 
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9. On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with 
Hantavirus. She died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days 
after Cathy's death, Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus. He is now 
permanently disabled as a result of the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444). 
10. Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris 
could both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's 
manufactured home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383, 
385, 446-448). 
11. Oakwood argued to the trial court "They (the homes) have 
penetrations in them. Those penetrations are signed off by HUD. They're part of a 
checklist the government has said 'Not a problem/ which creates the presumption 
that this home was free of defects." (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14, February 
28, 2005).4 
12. The checklist on which Oakwood relied is silent as to penetrations in 
the home. (R. at 331-338). 
This factual assertion comes entirely from the oral argument of February 
28, 2005 of Appellee's counsel and misrepresents, by material overstatement, what 
is actually contained in the record and contained within the checklist. 
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13. The trial court admitted the checklist as evidence, without affidavits 
demonstrating any evidentiary foundation for or describing the use of, the 
document. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-24, February 28, 2005).5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the record below contains prima facie evidence of each required 
element of proof of strict products liability under Utah law—including proof of 
non-compliance with governmental regulations. While the evidence may be 
disputed as to certain of the required elements of strict products liability, the 
evidence is clearly present in the record. 
Second, Appellee's purported "checklist" does not create the rebuttable 
presumption found and relied on by the trial court, because it is entirely silent as to 
penetrations in the exterior of the home, is contrary to the Code of Federal 
Regulations governing manufactured homes, is hearsay, is not self-authenticating, 
is not supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and is 
otherwise unreliable. Absent the wrongfully-imputed presumption of non-
defectiveness, Appellee's summary judgment motion should fail. 
Third, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred in granting 
54(b) certification, because the causes of action against remaining defendants are 
the same as those that are the subject of the summary judgment order, and are 
This evidence comes entirely from the statement and recognition of the 
Honorable Bruce K. Halliday during the oral argument on February 28, 2005. 
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based upon substantially the same operative facts. Further, there was just reason 
for delay of the 54(b) certification in the present case because of the possible res 
judicata effect and because Appellants must now litigate two cases instead of one. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it considered and ruled upon issues raised 
for the first time in the Appellee's reply memorandum. At a minimum, Appellants 
request that the issues presented for the first time in the Appellee's reply 
memorandum be remanded to the trial court for further discovery and trial on the 
merits. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred by finding that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact when the record shows that there were 30-50 "knockout-holes" at least the size 
of conduit deliberately manufactured into homes by Appellee, providing an entry 
point for Hantavirus-carrying deer mice. The trial court's conclusion was based on 
the erroneous assumption that Appellee was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
non-defectiveness under Utah's products liability statute, because the court 
accepted as evidence a checklist that (a) does not address the 30-50 penetrations 
present in the home, (b) is clearly hearsay, (c) is not self-authenticating, (d) is not 
supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and (e) is 
contrary to the enabling statute and rules promulgated by HUD applicable to 
manufactured homes. 
12 
The trial court further erred by allowing Appellee to raise defenses to 
Appellants' breach of warranty and failure to warn claims for the first time in a 
reply brief when those defenses were not raised in Appellee's moving papers, then 
deciding those issues without Appellants having an opportunity to address to those 
new issues. 
Finally, the trial court erred in granting 54(b) certification for Appellee's 
Summary Judgment Order when there remain other non-moving defendants who 
are defending the same and similar claims under the same operative facts. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANTS' STRICT 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY. 
To present a prima facie case for strict products liability against a 
manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a defect or defective condition in a 
product made it unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defect was present at the time of 
the product's sale, and (3) the defective condition was the cause of plaintiffs 
injuries. Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996). To defeat 
a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff need only show circumstantial evidence, 
whether expert or not, that a defect existed. Taylor v. Cooper Tire and Rubber 
Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1398, (10th Cir. 1997) {applying Utah state law); Non-
compliance with a government regulation is evidence of a defect or defective 
condition. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. (1998). 
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These rules are embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6, which provides: 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property 
damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be 
in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold 
by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or 
a defective condition in the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that 
the product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or 
user of that product in that community, considering the 
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience 
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free 
from any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect 
in the plans or design for the product or the methods and 
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product 
were in conformity with government standards established for 
that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or 
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing that product were 
adopted. 
(2002 & Supp. 2005). 
In considering a grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the trial 
court's legal decision for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts 
and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). 
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ANALYSIS 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellants have identified a specific defect 
in Defendant/Appellee's product 
Reasonable jurors could find that Appellee designed and manufactured a 
defect into its home by purposely drilling 30-50 holes in the bottom and sides of 
its homes and leaving those holes open and uncovered, thereby creating a point of 
entry for rodents—-just as in Taylor, the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Utah law, found 
that reasonable men could infer that a wheel was defective by virtue of the 
cumulative effect of circumstantial facts. 130 F.3d at 1398. 
The intended purpose of the 30-50 holes was to provide quick and, 
presumably, inexpensive access for hooking up plumbing and electrical 
connections that were "stubbed out" of the foundation on which the manufactured 
home was to be set. The unintended result of this design feature, however, was to 
create 30-50 portals through which rodents, including deer mice carrying the 
Hantavirus, could enter Appellee's manufactured home. Such lack of intention is 
not a defense to a strict products liability claim. 
The "ease of access" goal could have been easily accomplished—without 
creating an open doorway for a potentially fatal virus—by simply placing a 
temporary and removable cover over the pre-drilled holes, or by placing a "knock-
out" plug over each of the holes. Such a design would have closed off some 30-50 
ports of entry for rodents. Including a means of covering these rodent portals was 
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of particular importance where, as here, the Appellee well knew that the intended 
destination for their manufactured home was an open and unprotected field in the 
heart of Hantavirus country.6 
The additional labor and material required to provide this margin of safety, 
however, would have increased manufacturing costs and could have decreased 
profits, unless the costs were passed along in the sales price. All things considered, 
though, the marginal cost added to an already $65,000.00 home would have been a 
tiny price to pay for a huge safety return. 
The record of the case, then, does contain specific evidence of an 
identifiable defective condition that could easily, inexpensively, and effectively 
been remedied. Accordingly, Appellants satisfy their burden of proof under the 
summary judgment standard on the first prong of a strict products liability theory. 
2. The defect was present at the time the product was sold. 
This is an undisputed fact. The first person to inspect the Appellee's homes 
following delivery to Helper from the manufacturing plant—John Schramm— 
testified specifically as to the numbers and locations of the open holes in the 
underside and sidewalls of the homes. Mr. Schramm also specifically described 
the purpose and use of the holes. Without any doubt, the defective condition 
6
 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) foresaw such a 
problem and promulgated 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603, requiring all "exterior openings 
around piping to be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents." 
16 
identified and asserted by Appellants was present in the Appellee's manufactured 
homes at the time the homes left Appellee's plant and at the time the homes amved 
on the Helper lot for resale. Accordingly, Appellants satisfy their burden on 
summary judgment as to the second element of a strict products liability claim. 
3. The defect was the proximate cause of Appellants9 injuries. 
Appellee did not dispute this issue below. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 18:14-
21, February 28, 2005). Indeed, it is undisputed that Cathy Dimick contracted and 
died from Hantavirus, and that Chris Dimick contracted and suffered severe injury 
from Hantavirus. It is also undisputed that Cathy and Chris Dimick became ill 
within a few days of one another, giving rise to the strong inference that they were 
exposed to the virus at the same time and the same place. 
Moreover, although Appellee or the remaining defendants may attempt to 
offer controverting proof, there is substantial evidence in the record that the only 
time and place that Cathy and Chris Dimick were together during the 75-90 day 
incubation period for Hantavirus was the single occasion on which they jointly 
toured Appellee's manufactured home. (R. at 447-448). Further, while it may 
later be disputed, there is substantial evidence in the record that Cathy and Chris 
Dimick were not simultaneously exposed to deer mice or hantavirus at any other 
time or place in proximity to the onset of their illness. (R. at 383, 385, 446-448). 
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4. The home's non-compliance with applicable government 
regulations is prima facie evidence of its defective condition. 
The violation of a statute may be regarded as prima facie evidence of 
negligence. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998). The 30-50 holes that 
were built into the home, then left open and uncovered by Appellee, violated 
Housing and Urban Development Rules promulgated in 1975 and in effect in 1998. 
The applicable Code of Federal Regulations specifically requires that "[a] 11 
exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the 
entrance of rodents." 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 (b)(6)7. 
The record clearly shows that the "stubbed out" electrical and plumbing 
hookups were not "generally caulked" but were in "some instances" believed to 
have expanding foam around them. (R. at 468-469). Some of these holes were 
clearly not caulked—as evidenced by the fact Mr. Schram could see insulation 
through the penetrations. (R. at 399-401, 464-465). Moreover, the record clearly 
shows that these holes could be entry points for mice. (R. at 21-22) 
Accordingly, the record contains evidence showing the presence of a defect 
based on a violation of an applicable government standard. 
Appellants were not obligated to rebut the presumption of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-15-6(3) that the home was free from any defect or defective condition 
because the home actually failed to comply with the government standards relating 
to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND RELYING 
UPON AN UNRELIABLE CHECKLIST CHARACTERIZED 
BY APPELLEE AS A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT AND AS 
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT 
STANDARDS, WHEN THE DOCUMENT IS HEARSAY, IS 
NOT SELF-AUTHENTICATING, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
FOUNDATIONAL AFFIDAVITS, AND APPEARS TO 
CONTRADICT THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) mandates that evidence proffered on a summary 
judgment motion must—on its face—be admissible evidence: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. 
{Emphasis added.) Moreover, hearsay that is not independently trustworthy is not 
admitted because the person proffering the facts is not under oath and not subject 
to cross-examination. State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390, 6 Utah 2d 198 (1957). 
Here, the document on which Appellee and the trial court relied for claiming 
compliance of the manufactured home with government regulations (R. at 331-
338)—thereby creating a presumption of non-defectiveness—falls far short of 
being admissible, competent evidence. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting a checklist initialed by multiple unidentified parties and 
signed off by an unidentified person, because the document is hearsay, not self-
authenticating, and is not explained or supported by affidavits based on personal 
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knowledge stating the competency of the affiant with respect to the specific facts 
contained in the document at issue. 
In the present case, the purported "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection 
Form" is inherently untrustworthy because it is completely silent as to the specific 
federal regulations promulgated by HUD for "Manufactured Home Construction 
and Safety" on the precise construction element at issue—"Rodent resistance." As 
shown above, HUD regulations require that "[a]ll exterior openings around piping 
and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents." 24 C.F.R. § 
3280.603 (b)(6) (1998). In contrast, Appellee's purported HUD checklist fails 
entirely to address the 30-50 built-in holes or any "exterior openings around 
piping." 
Furthermore, the checklist appears to be initialed by at least 12 different 
unidentified persons and signed by a Ronald Petterson whose role with the 
government, if any, is unknown. Nothing authenticates or provides foundation for 
the checklist. From the face of the document, it appears to be an in-house and, 
therefore, self-serving document, as opposed to an official government approval of 
anything. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING ISSUES 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN APPELLEE'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limit reply memoranda to "rebuttal of 
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief 
are considered waived and will not be considered. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89, ^ 23, 16 P.3d 540. "This is to prevent the resulting unfairness to respondent 
if an argument or issue was first raised in the reply brief and the respondent had 
no opportunity to respond." Id. 
Here, the trial court erred by considering issues raised for the first time in 
Appellee's reply memorandum and not raised in the memorandum supporting 
Appellee's motion. 
Specifically, Appellants' complaint asserts claims for Strict Product 
Liability; Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach 
of Warranty of Merchantability; Breach of Express Warranty; Negligent Failure to 
Warn; and Premises Liability (R. at 171-184, 472-484), but Appellee's summary 
judgment motion and supporting memorandum attacked only the strict products 
liability theory. Relying thereon, Appellants' opposition addressed only the strict 
liability issue. (R. at 379-395). 
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Then, in its reply memorandum, Appellee argued for the first time that 
summary judgment should be granted on Appellants' Breach of Implied Warranty 
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, Breach of Warranty of Merchantability, Breach 
of Express Warranty, Negligent Failure to Warn, and Premises Liability theories. 
(R. at 455-459). The trial court then granted Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on all of Appellants' theories of liability. (R. at 615-617). 
As a result, Appellants were unfairly precluded from marshaling evidence or 
making argument in opposition on any warranty or failure to warn theory—since 
these theories were not attacked in Appellee's opening memorandum. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling on any aspect of Appellee's motion 
other than the strict products liability theory. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 54(b) 
CERTIFICATION BECAUSE THE LEGAL THEORIES AND 
OPERATIVE FACTS OF WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RESTS ARE IDENTICAL TO THEORIES AND FACTS 
PENDING AGAINST THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS, AND 
BECAUSE THERE IS JUST REASON FOR DELAY. 
In pertinent part, Rule 54(b) states: 
When more than one claim for relief is present in an action . . . , 
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an expressed determination by the court 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction 
for the entry of judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has identified three requirements for certification 
under Rule 54(b): 
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the 
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered 
on an order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims 
or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, 
must make a determination that uthere is no just reason for delay" of 
the appeal. 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991) 
(quotation omitted). Determining whether an order is "final" is a question of law, 
therefore the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness. Id. 
at 1100. 
1. There Are Multiple Claims For Relief And 
Parties To This Action. 
As shown by the complaint, the first criterion for certification requiring 
multiple claims or multiple parties to the action is met. (R. at 171-184). 
2. The Judgment Appealed From Must Have Been Entered On An 
Order That Would Be Appealable But For The Fact That Other 
Claims Or Parties Remain In The Action. 
The second criterion is not met in the instant case because the remaining 
claims against other defendants, and the operative facts relative to those claims, are 
substantially the same as those certified by the trial court's order. The Utah 
Supreme Court has found that the second criteria is not met where the operative 
facts substantially overlap facts that also serve as the basis for other theories 
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pending before the trial court. Kennecott, at 1105. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme 
Court noted that where the facts are sufficiently similar to constitute res judicata 
on the remaining issues, 54(b) certification is generally precluded. Id. 
In Kennecott, taxpayers brought an action against the Utah State Tax 
Commission and several county and state tax officials. Id. at 1100. The taxpayers 
questioned the constitutionality of a state statute under three separate constitutional 
provisions. Id. The trial court, in Kennecott, partially granted the tax collectors' 
motion for summary judgment, stating the taxpayers did not have standing on one 
of the three constitution issues. Id. The trial court certified the order. Id. The 
Utah Supreme Court raised the 54(b) certification issue sua sponte. The Utah 
Supreme Court noted that the remaining issues were based upon the same 
overlapping and operative facts, therefore, the trial court incorrectly certified the 
order as final under 54(b). Id. at 1105. Further, the Court noted that facts that 
would constitute res judicata would be generally preclude 54(b) certification. Id. 
In the present case, the claims against the Appellee were: 1) Strict Products 
Liability; 2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; 3) 
Breach of Warranty of Merchantability; 4) Breach of Express Warranty; 5) 
Negligent Failure to Warn; and 6) Premises Liability. The claims pending against 
the remaining defendants are identical Moreover, the following operative facts— 
as to which the trial made findings on summary judgment, and on which the trial 
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court based conclusions of law on summary judgment—relate identically to claims 
against remaining defendants: 
* * * 
4. Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the 
Home was delivered to Happy Homes' sales lot on June 1998. 
5. Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home, 
Happy Homes' agents and employees inspected the Home. 
6. Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe 
any problems with, defects in, or defective conditions in the home 
when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took possession of the 
home. The home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy 
Homes. 
7. Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems 
with, defects in, or defective conditions of the Home. 
8. On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the 
Home with his parents, Reid and Cathy Dimick, and that same day 
contracted to buy the Home for Happy Homes. 
9. The home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper, 
Utah from June 1998 until the home was delivered to Christopher 
Dimick's property on May 22, 2000. 
10. Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home 
on the Happy Homes lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998 
and to disassemble the Home for transport to the Dimick property in 
2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with 
the Home on either occasion. 
11. Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy 
Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms. Musgrave showed the Home to 
prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998 and May 
2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the 
Home and never saw any evidence of mice in the Home. 
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(R. at 614-615). 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court specifically noted in Kennecott, the trial 
court's conclusions of law, based on the foregoing findings of fact, are so grossly 
and overly broad that the remaining defendants could assert them as res judicata of 
claims remaining against them, and use them as a sword against Appellants: 
1. Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) 
presumption that the home was free from any defect or defective 
condition because the home complied with government standards 
relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured 
homes. 
2. Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the home was 
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, no 
evidence that a defect existed at the time the home was sold, and no 
evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their 
alleged injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for 
strict products liability and breach of warranty (merchantability) fail 
as a matter of law. 
3. There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in 
the home, a necessary element of plaintiffs claim against Oakwood for 
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and 
therefore the claims fail as a matter of law. 
4. There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition 
in the home, and no evidence that Oakwood breached any expressed 
warranty, and therefore the claims fail as a matter of law. 
5. There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition 
in the home, a necessary element of plaintiffs5 claims against 
Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claims fail as 
a matter of law. 
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6. There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or 
possessory interest in the home after it had been sold and delivered to 
Happy Homes, therefore Oakwood did not owe any duty to plaintiffs 
as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect or 
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the home that proximately 
caused plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Because these are necessary 
elements of plaintiffs' premises liability claims against Oakwood, the 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
(R. at 615-617). 
Finally, these conclusions of law are contrary to, and are not supported by 
any facts in, the record cited by Appellee in its moving or reply memoranda. Thus, 
these facts and conclusions, as reflected in the order, could improperly have a res 
judicata effect for each and all of the remaining defendants. This is the very 
circumstance that the Utah Supreme Court has held should preclude 54(b) 
certification—and explains precisely why the second criteria for certification is not 
met in the instant case. 
3. There Is Just Reason for Delay of this Appeal. 
There is just reason to have delayed appeal of the present case. First, the 
remaining defendants can use the summary judgment order as a sword or shield. 
Second, Appellants are being required to litigate two cases (one at the trial court 
and this appeal), instead of one—when a refusal to certify the case could well have 
resulted in a settlement of the case with the remaining defendants, thereby avoiding 
this appeal altogether. Certification in this case, then, causes "piecemeal" 
litigation, rather than serving to avoid it. 
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Moreover, there is particular prejudice where, as here, Appellee's summary 
judgment memoranda relied exclusively upon intra-defendant depositions and 
interrogatories, and the trial court subsequently used that as the sole basis for its 
summary judgment order. Certifying the summary judgment order under these 
circumstances enables a collusive environment between parties with potentially 
adverse interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Initially, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred in granting 
54(b) certification, because the causes of action against remaining defendants are 
the same as those that are the subject of the summary judgment order, and are 
based upon substantially the same operative facts. Further, there was just reason 
for delay of the 54(b) certification in the present case because of the possible res 
judicata effect and because Appellants must now litigate two cases instead of one. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant requests that this Court dismiss this 
appeal in its entirety as erroneously certified under rule 54(b). 
If this appeal is considered, the record below contains prima facie evidence 
of each required element of proof of strict products liability under Utah law— 
including proof of non-compliance with governmental regulations. While the 
evidence may be disputed as to certain of the required elements of strict products 
liability, the evidence is clearly present in the record. Under this circumstance, 
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summary judgment is improper and Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
remand the case for trial on the merits. 
Appellee's purported "checklist7' does not create the rebuttable presumption 
found and relied on by the trial court, because it is entirely silent as to penetrations 
in the exterior of the home, is contrary to the Code of Federal Regulations 
governing manufactured homes, is hearsay, is not self-authenticating, is not 
supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and is 
otherwise unreliable. Absent the wrongfilly-imputed presumption of non-
defectiveness, Appellee's summary judgment motion should fail, and the case 
should be remanded for trial on the merits. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it considered and ruled upon issues raised 
for the first time in the Appellee's reply memorandum. At a minimum, Appellants 
request that the issues presented for the first time in the Appellee's reply 
memorandum be remanded to the trial court for further discovery and trial on the 
merits. 
P^espectfiilly submitted this 28th day of February 2006. 
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
TITLE 24--HOUSENG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
SUBTITLE B--REGULATIONS RELATING TO HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
CHAPTER XX--OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HOUSING-FEDERAL HOUSING 
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
PART 3280-MANUFACTURED HOME CONSTRUCTION AND SAFETY STANDARDS 
SUBPART G-PLUMBING SYSTEMS 
§ 3280.603 General requirements. 
(a) Minimum requirements. Any plumbing system installed in a manufactured home shall conform, at least, with the 
provisions of this subpart. 
(1) General The plumbing system shall be of durable material free from defective workmanship, and so designed and 
constructed as to give satisfactory service for a reasonable life expectancy. 
(2) Conservation. Water closets shall be selected and adjusted to use the minimum quantity of water consistent with 
proper performance and cleaning. 
(3) Connection to drainage system. All plumbing, fixtures, drains, appurtenances, and appliances designed or used to 
receive or discharge liquid waste or sewage shall be connected to the manufactured home drainage system in a manner 
provided by this standard. 
(4) Workmanship. All design, construction, and workmanship shall be in conformance with accepted engineering 
practices and shall be of such character as to secure the results sought to be obtained by this standard. 
(5) Components. Plumbing materials, devices, fixtures, fittings, equipment, appliances, appurtenance, and accessories 
intended for use in or attached to a manufactured home shall conform to one of the applicable standards referenced in § 
3280.604. Where an applicable standard is not referenced, or an alternative recognized standard is utilized, the plumbing 
component shall be listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, inspection agency or other qualified organization 
as suitable for the intended use. 
(6) Prohibited fittings and practices. 
(i) Drainage or vent piping shall not be drilled and tapped for the purpose of making connections. 
(ii) Except as specifically provided elsewhere in this standard, vent pipes shall not be used as waste or drain pipes. 
(iii) Fittings, connections, devices, or methods of installation that obstruct or retard the flow of sewage, or air in the 
drainage or venting systems in an amount greater than the normal frictional resistance to flow shall not be used unless 
their use is acceptable in this standard or their use is accepted as having a desirable and acceptable function of ultimate 
benefit to the proper and continued functioning of the plumbing system. 
(iv) Cracks, holes, or other imperfections in materials shall not be concealed by welding, brazing, or soldering or by 
paint, wax. tar, or other leak-sealing or repairing agents. 
(v) Piping, fixtures or equipment shall be located so as not to interfere with the normal use or with the normal operation 
and use of windows, doors or other required facilities. 
(vi) Galvanized pipe shall not be bent or welded. 
(7) Alignment of fittings. All valves, pipes, and fittings shall be installed in correct relationship to the direction of flow. 
(b) Protective requirements. 
(1) Cutting structural members. Structural members shall not be unnecessarily or carelessly weakened by cutting or 
notching. 
(2) Exposed piping. All piping, pipe threads, hangers, and support exposed to the weather, water, mud, and road hazard, 
and subject to damage therefrom, shall be painted, coated, wrapped, or otherwise protected from deterioration. 
(3) Road damage. Pipes, supports, drains, outlets, or drain hoses shall not extend or protrude in a manner where they 
could be unduly subjected to damage during transit. 
(4) Freezing. All piping and fixtures subject to freezing temperatures shall be insulated or protected to prevent freezing, 
under normal occupancy. The manufacturer shall provide: (i) Written installation instructions for the method(s) required 
for compliance to this section; (ii) a statement in his installation instructions that if heat tape is used it shall be listed for 
use with manufactured homes; (iii) a receptacle outlet for the use of a heat tape located on the underside of the 
manufactured home within 2 feet of the water supply inlet. The receptacle outlet provided shall not be placed on a 
branch circuit which is protected by a ground fault circuit interrupter. 
(5) All piping, except the fixture trap, shall be designed to allow drainage. 
(6) Rodent resistance. All exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of 
rodents. 
(7) Piping and electrical wiring shall not pass through the same holes in walls, floors or roofs. Plastic piping shall not be 
exposed to heat in excess of manufacturers recommendation or radiation from beat producing appliances. 
[40 FR 58752, Dec. 18, 1975, as amended at 42 FR 54383, Oct. 5, 1977. Redesignated at 44 FR 20679, Apr. 6, 1979, as 
amended at 47 FR 28092, June 29, 1982; 58 FR 55012, Oct. 25, 1993] 
24 C. F. R. § 3280.603 
24 CFR § 3280.603 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R.—Allowance of punitive damages, 13 property as element of damages in products 
A L R 4th 52 habibtj 89 A L R 4th 11 
Consequential loss of profits from injury to 
78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product after sale 
as substantial contributing cause — Manufac-
turer or seller not liable. 
For purposes of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include an alteration or 
modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the 
manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed the 
purpose, use, function, design, or intended use or manner of use of the product 
from that for which the product was originally designed, tested, or mtended 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-5, enacted by L. an> person or circumstance is held invalid the 
1977, ch. 149, § 5; 1989, ch. 119, § 2. remainder of the act is to be given effect with-
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1989, ch out the invalid provision or application 
119, § 4 provides that if any provision of the act Cross-References. — Comparative negh-
(which enacted § 78 15-3 and amended this gence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38 
section), or the application of any provision to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Alteration or modification required. This section requires some sort of phvsical 
This section did not apply where there was no alteration or modification of the product itself 
alteration or modification of the product which which leaves the product in a different condi-
changed its purpose or use from that for which tion or form than it was in when it left the 
it was designed Mulherin v Ingersoll-Rand manufacturer's or seller's hands Beacham v 
Co , 628 P2d 1301 (Utah 1981) Lee-Norse, 714 F2d 1010 (10th Cir 1983) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
product-caused harm, 41 A L R 4th 1251 
Products liability product misuse defense, 65 
A L R 4th 263 
Products liability injury caused by product 
as a result of being tampered with, 67 
A L R 4th 964 
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused 
by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87 
A L R 4th 804 
78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making product 
unreasonably dangerous — Rebuttable pre-
sumption. 
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage 
allegedly caused by a defect in a product 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be m a defective 
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product 
which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Survey of 
Utah Strict Products Liability Law From Hahn 
to the Present and Beyond, 1992 B YU L Rev 
1173 
A.L.R. — Statute precluding or limiting re-
covery where product has been altered or mod-
ified after leaving hands of manufacturer or 
seller, 4 l A L R 4 t h 4 7 
Alteration of product after it leaves hands of 
manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for 
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PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT 78-15-6 
(2) As used m this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the 
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product m 
that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, 
risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or 
experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any 
defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or 
designs for the product or the methods and techmques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government 
standards established for that industry which were m existence at the 
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted 
History: C. 1953, 78-15-6, enacted by L. act"m Subsection (2) means Laws 1977, Chap-
1977, ch. 149, § 6. ter 149 which enacted this chapter 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Burden of proof 
Drugs 
Duty to warn 
—Causation 
—Label warning 




Simultaneous cause of action 
Test for strict liability 
Cited 
Burden of proof. 
To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff needed 
to assert a defect or defective condition In 
statutory terms, plaintiff needed to submit 
some evidence that there was a defect m the 
product that she alleged had caused her inju-
ries, that the defect existed at the time the 
product was sold, and that the defect made the 
product unreasonably dangerous Klemert v 
Kimball Elevator Co , 854 P2d 1025 (Utah Ct 
App 1993) 
Drugs. 
A drug approved by the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), properly pre-
pared, compounded, packaged, and distributed, 
cannot as a matter of law be "defective" in the 
absence of proof of maccurate, incomplete, mis-
leading, or fraudulent information furnished by 
the manufacturer in connection with FDA ap-
proval Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d 89 
(Utah 1991) 
Duty to warn. 
—Causation. 
When it cannot be demonstrated what the 
plaintiff would have done had he or she been 
adequately warned plaintiff should be afforded 
a rebuttable presumption that he or she would 
have followed an adequate warning had one 
been provided House v Armour of Am, Inc 
886 P2d 542 (Utah Ct App 1994), aff'd, 929 
P2d 340 (Utah 1996) 
—Label warning. 
In a wrongful death action involving the use 
of a bullet-resistant vest by deceased law en-
forcement officer, whether the label, which did 
not include a warning that the vest alone would 
not stop n n e fire, provided adequate warning 
was a question of fact to be judged in light of the 
ordmarv knowledge common to members of the 
law enforcement community House v Armour 
of Am , Inc , 886 P2d 542 (Utah Ct App 1994), 
aff'd, 929 P2d 340 (Utah 1996) 
—Open and obvious danger. 
The presence of an "open and obvious" danger 
is merely one factor for the trier of fact to 
consider when assessing the liability of the 
defendant in a strict liability case — it does not 
operate as a complete bar to the injured party's 
recovery House v Armour of Am , Inc , 886 P 2d 
542 (Utah Ct App 1994), aff'd, 929 P2d 340 
(Utah 1996) 
A broad grant of immunity from strict liabil-
ity claims based on design defects should be 
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs 
m Utah Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d 89 
(Utah 1991) 
—Safer product. 
A nailer was not defective, and the defen-
dant's decision to market the product was not 
negligent, since there was no duty for a manu-
facturer to warn or inform consumers that a 
409 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment . 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a c] , counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, sn ^ay time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to 
the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts tha t appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion tha t the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to 
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant 
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the 
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party 
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amend- ment" for "move with or without supporting 
ment substituted "move for summary judg- affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
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Cited in Zion's First Nat'l Bank v 
t, nnemore, 655 P2d 1111 (Utah 1982), State v 
fnes 656 P2d 1012 (Utah 1982\ State v 
tolasquez, 672 P2d 1254 (Utah 1983), In re 
ILK 728 P2d 988 (Utah 1986), State v 
Walker, 743 P2d 191 (Utah 1987), State ex rel 
qtate Dep't of Social Servs v Woods, 744 P2d 
015 (Utah Ct App 1987), Tripp v Vaughn, 747 
P2d 1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), State v Barber, 
747 P2d 436 (Utah Ct App 1987), Miller v 
L b e r 749 P2d 1274 (Utah Ct App 1988), 
State v Thomas, 777 P2d 445 (Utah 1989), 
Mernam v Mernam, 799 P2d 1172 (Utah Ct 
App 1990), State v Martinez, 811 P2d 205 
(Utah Ct App 1991), State v Taylor, 818 P2d 
561 (Utah Ct App 1991), Department of Air 
Force v Swider, 824 P2d 448 (Utah Ct App 
1991), State \ Allen, 839 P2d 291 (Utah 1992), 
State v Seale, 853 P2d 862 (Utah 1993), State 
\ Arguelles, 921 P2d 439 (Utah 1996), State v 
Perez, 924 P2d 1 (Utah Ct App 1996), Julian v 
State, 966 P2d 249 (Utah 1998), Fishbaugh v 
Utah Power & Light 969 P2d 403 (Utah 1998), 
West Valley City v Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, 5 
P3d 1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi 
dence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L Rev 683 
Bngham Young Law Review. — The Hob-
goblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence An 
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent 
Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B Y U L 
Rev 231 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com 
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
tutional Imphcations, 15 J Contemp L 81 
(1989) 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 
§ 493 et seq 
C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 259 et seq 
AX.R. — Admissibility of impeached wit-
ness' prior consistent statement — modern 
state criminal cases, 58 A L R 4th 1014 
Admissibihty of tape recording or transcript 
of "911" emergency telephone call, 3 A L R 5th 
784 
Admissibility m evidence of composite pic-
ture or sketch produced by police to identify 
offender, 23 A L R 5th 672 
Admissibihty as "not hearsay" of statement 
by party's attorney under Federal Rules of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or 801(d)(2)(D), 117 
A L R Fed 599 
Interpreter or translator as party's agent for 
purposes of "admission by party-opponent" ex-
ception to hearsay rule (Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)), 121 A L R Fed 611 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(1974), and is the same as the first paragraph of 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
Cross-References. —Affidavits, taking and 
certification of, § 78-26-5 et seq 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8 
Judgment, entry of, U R C P 58A 
Judgment roll m criminal case, contents and 
filing, U R Cnm P 22 
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing, 
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3, 
U R C P 44 
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
In general 




Hearsay is generally not admissible on the 
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two 
basic reasons (1) the person who purports to 
know the facts is not stating them under oath, 
(2) that person is not present for cross-exami-
nation State v Sibert 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P 2d 
388 (1957) 
Chemical breath analysis . 
Section 41-6-44 3, governing the admission of 
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory 
exception to the hearsay rule Layton City v 
Bennett, 741 P2d 965 (Utah Ct App 1987), 
cert denied, 765 P2d 1277 (Utah 1988) 
Nonhearsay. 
Pohce officer's recounting of victim's report of 
the crime was not hearsay because it was not 
presented for the t ruth of the matter, but to 
explain why the officer took the investigative 
steps that he did State v Bryant, 965 P2d 539 
(Utah Ct App 1998) 
Purpose. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose 
the exclusion of evidence not subject to cross-
examination concerning the truthfalness of the 
matters asserted State v Long, 721 P2d 483 
(Utah 1986) 
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New trial. 
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be 
served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing does not apply to 
motion for new trial and such notice is not 
integral part of motion for new trial; rule does 
not change procedure whereby a motion can be 
called up at any time parties desire to do so. 
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 
275 (1960). 
—Compliance wi th rule. 
Actual notice. 
The trial court may dispense with technical 
compliance with the five-day notice provision of 
Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof that 
a party had actual notice and time to prepare to 
meet the questions raised by the motion. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236 
(1974); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 
P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992). 
Ineffective not ice . 
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to 
give five days' notice when notice was by mail, 
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for 
mailing were to be deducted from eight-day 
period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1975). 
Time to prepare. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day no-
tice of hearing to release property subject to 
writ of attachment where he had adequate time 
to prepare for hearing and defendant was re-
quired to post cashier's check in lieu of security. 




Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for 
continuance five days before date set for hear-
ing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying 
motion justified denial of motion where plain-
tiff's counsel did not learn of reason for plain-
tiff's inability to appear at hearing in time to 
make motion five days before hearing and Rule 
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to 
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 
2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v. 
Larson, 555 P.2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen 
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978); 
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium 
Servs., Inc., 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal 
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v. 
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Huston v. Lewis, 818 R2d 531 (Utah 1991); 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 
90, 54 P.3d 1153. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et 
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders 
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117, 
227-229. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8; 
66 C.J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading 
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78. 
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting new 
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute 
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674. 
Validity of service of summons or complaint 
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th 
213. 
What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
dismissal under state statute or court rule 
requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
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(b) Motions, An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. Within five days after sendee of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to 
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other 
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex 
parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported b}^  
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
an}^ additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action 
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds tha t the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
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(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made 
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not 
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so, when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted "denominated as such" after 
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Sub-
divisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d) 
to (g). 
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in pro-
ceedings before a court commissioner" in Sub-
division (b); substituted the first paragraph in 
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths 
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivi-
sion (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other 
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added 
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substi-
tuted "recommendation" for "recommended or-
der" several times and substituted "made in 
open court" for "entered" and added the clause 
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and 
added the second paragraph of the Advisory 
Committee Note. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-* 
ings to conform to evidence, motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
U.R.C.P. 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P. 
12(i). 
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50. 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78-34-6. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78-36-9. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Partition of property, complaint to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2. 
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P 60. 
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
65B(a). 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-
2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 
Tab 6 
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objectil 
must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motif! 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) s 
Compiler's Notes . 
Rule 53, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to Cross -References . — Challenging of jurni 
for cause. U.R.C.P. 47(f). ^ 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Report. 
—Failure to object. 
Waiver. 
Scope of appointment. 
Status as judicial officer. 
Cited. 
Report. 
—Failure to object. 
Waiver. 
One who made no objection to master's report 
as required by this rule could not question the 
report for the first tune on appeal from district 
court order adopting the master's findings. 
Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah 1980). 
Scope of appointment. 
A special master who was directed to review 
requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the 
scope of his appointment by investigating i 
reporting on the issue of attorney's fees sii 
the court had already ordered an award H 
attorney's fees and the parties had no : 
that the master was to review that award j 
did the parties have an opportunity to pa 
pate in the master's proceedings. Plumb* 
State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990) 
S t a t u s as j ud i c i a l officer. 
A special master has the duties and obligali 
tions of a judicial officer, and thus should nd| 
engage in unethical ex parte contacts with thl 
judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent 
to the substance of the referral. Plumb v States 
809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
Ci ted in Jones, "Waldo, Holbrook & McDon-
ough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et 
seq., 30 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521 
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq. 
A-L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who 
has not filed timely petition for review of refer-
ee's order to participate in appeal secured by 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. 
Power of successor or substituted master or 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on 
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d 
1079. 
Referee's failure to file report within time 
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R 4th 889. 
What are "exceptional conditions'" justifying 
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1 
A.L.R. Fed. 922. 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Rule 54. Judgments ; costs, 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and 
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the 
court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall 
not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and I or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court tha t there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
tha t adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
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before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief 
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from, or exceed in amount, tha t specifically prayed for in the demand for 
judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made 
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, 
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state 
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed onl}^ to the extent permitted 
by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs 
are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum 
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs 
taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as 
served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include 
in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the 
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. 
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, 
in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in 
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation 
thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend- now, Rule 34(d), Utah RApp.P. 
ment added the last sentence to Subdivision (a) This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
and made stylistic changes. Cross -References . — Continuances, discre-
Compiler's Notes . — Subdivisions (d)(3) tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b). 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the State, payment of costs awarded against, 
appellate court and costs in original proceed- § 78-27-13. 
ings before the Supreme Court, were repealed Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel- U.R.C.P. 62(h). 
late Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78-46-30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Absence of express determination. — In general. 
Amendment of pleadings. —Challenge of award. 
Appeal as of right. —Depositions. 
Certification not determinative. —Discretionary. 
Costs. —Expenses of preparation for action. 
